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In this paper we show that lobbying in conditions of “direct democracy” is virtually impossible,
even in conditions of complete information about voters preferences, since it would require solving
a very computationally hard problem. We use the apparatus of parametrized complexity for this
purpose.
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1 Direct and Representative Democracy
Countrywide votes on a speciﬁc issue are an accepted way of resolving political issues in many countries
around the world. Such votes are usually termed ”referenda.” A referendum gives the people the chance
to vote directly on a speciﬁc issue. Although people can also make choices at general elections, these
elections are usually fought on a number of issues and often no clear verdict on any one issue is delivered.
So instead of voting for only representatives, referenda allow citizens to vote directly on some federal
matters. In Switzerland and California, for example, referenda are very common.
It is a commonplace that an ideal democratic political system should combine both referenda and
representative government. A key issue is the relative weightings of these two ingredients. Referenda are
costly. However, in the fully computerized society, to which we are gradually moving, referenda could be
cheap and fast. Hence the relative weightings of the two ingredients may be expected to change.
Another development that might drive this change is the relative simplicity of lobbying such legislative
bodies as the American Congress and House of Representatives. In his book, Phillips observes that Wash-
ington has become increasingly dominated by an interest-group elite which is now so deeply entrenched
and so resistant to change that the proper functioning of government is impossible [15]. He suggests that
representative democracy be restored to Athenian direct democracy through the use of referenda.
In this paper we show that lobbying in conditions of “direct democracy” is computationally virtually
impossible, even in conditions of complete information about voters’ preferences. We use the apparatus
of parametrized complexity for this purpose. We envision that computational complexity may play a
positive role in voting, protecting the integrity of social choice. Such a role would resemble the situation
in public-key cryptography [7] where computational complexity protects the privacy of communication.
As far as we know, this is the ﬁrst paper which considers applications of parametrized complexity to social
choice. Previously, complexity issues in social choice were considered in [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14].
2 Parametrized Complexity
For those not familiar with computational complexity, we provide a quick sketch of concepts and termi-
nology. The reader should consult [8, 12] for more details.
The standard paradigm of complexity theory is embodied in the contrast between P and NP problems.
Problems in P are those which admit an algorithm that, given any input x of size n, produces the output
Output(x) required by the problem speciﬁcation in time O(nα), that is in time bounded by Cnα, where α
and C are constants. The notation P designates the class of problems solvable in polynomial time. Such
algorithms are generally considered to be tractable. NP denotes the class of non-deterministic polynomial
time solvable problems. For such problems, for each input x, there is a polynomial time algorithm that
justiﬁes that Output(x) is indeed the output required by the speciﬁcations of the problem. NP contains
P and it is believed that P = NP . The hardest problems in NP are called NP -complete. They are all
equivalent in a sense that any such problem can be reduced to an instance of any other NP -complete
problem and such reduction can be made in polynomial time. So, if one NP -complete problem can be
solved in polynomial time, then all of them can be solved in this way and it would follow that NP = P .
NP -completeness is therefore taken as evidence of inherent intractability.
However, in reality we are often interested in the tractability of problems when values of a certain
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parameter k (representing some aspect of the input) are small. In this case we need to undertake the
parametrized comlexity analysis as developed by Downey and Fellows in [8]. A problem is said to be in
the class FPT (Fixed Parameter Tractable) if there exists an algorithm solving the problem and running
in time f(k)nc, where c is a ﬁxed constant and f is an arbitrary computable function. If our problem
belongs to this class, then it is tractable for small values of k. Unlike the P versus NP paradigm, here
we obtain a hierarchy of parametrized complexity classes
FPT = W [0] ⊆ W [1] ⊆ W [2] ⊆ . . .
(see [8] for exact deﬁnition of these classes). Being W [2]-complete is considered strong evidence that the
problem is not tractable even for small values of the parameter. Two W [2]-complete problems that will
be important later in this paper are described below.
Given a graph G = (V,E) with a set of vertices V and the set of edges E, we say that a subset of the
set of vertices V ′ ⊆ V is a dominating set if every vertex in V is adjacent to at least one vertex in V ′. If
V ′ is dominating and consists of k vertices we will say that it is a k-dominating set. The set V ′ is called
independent if no two vertices of V ′ are adjacent. The picture below shows a 3-dominating set which is
not independent and an independent 4-dominating set.
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3-dominating set
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Independent 4-dominating set
The k-Dominating Set problem takes as input a graphG and a positive integer k, which is considered
as parameter. The question asks whether there exists a k-dominating set in G. The k-Dominating
Set problem has been shown to be W [2]-complete by Downey and Fellows (1999). They consider that
“k-Dominating Set problem represents some fundamental “wall of intractability” where there is no
signiﬁcant alternative to trying all k-subsets for solving the problem.” [8], p.15.
The Independent k-Dominating Set problem is also W [2]-complete. The input is the same as for
the k-Dominating Set, and the question asks whether G has an independent dominating set of size k.
3 Lobbying on a Restricted Budget
We consider the problem faced by an actor that wishes to inﬂuence the vote of a certain legislative body
or a referendum on a number of issues by trying to exert inﬂuence on particular agents. We will refer
to this actor as “The Lobby”. It is assumed that The Lobby has complete information about agents’
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preferences. The Lobby has a ﬁxed budget and has to be selective in choosing agents to distribute the
limited budget among them. It is reasonable to assume that the number of agents k that can realistically
be inﬂuenced is relatively small, and hence this aspect of the input is appropriate as a parameter for the
complexity analysis. Hence the use of parametrized complexity developed by Downey and Fellows (1999)
is completely appropriate for this problem. This is the ﬁrst time that parametrized complexity is used in
application to social choice studies. Our formal model of the problem is as follows:
The problem: Optimal Lobbying (OL)
Instance: An n by m 0/1 matrix E , a positive integer k, and a length m 0/1 vector x. (Each
row of E represents an agents. Each column represents a referendum in the election or a
certain issue to be voted on by the legislative body. The 0/1 values in a given row represent
the natural inclination of the agent with respect to the referendum questions put to a vote in
the election. The vector x represents the outcomes preferred by The Lobby.)
Parameter: k (representing the number of agents to be inﬂuenced)
Question: Is there a choice of k rows of the matrix, such that these rows can be edited so that
in each column of the resulting matrix, a majority vote in that column yields the outcome
targeted by The Lobby?
Proposition 1. Optimal Lobbying is W [2]-hard.
Proof. One of the standard techniques of proving a problem is W [2]-hard is to reduce a problem that is
already known to be W [2]-hard to our problem. We reduce from the W [2]-complete k-Dominating Set
problem. Given a graph G = (V,E), and a positive integer k for which we wish to determine whether
G has a k-element dominating set, we produce the following set of inputs to the Optimal Lobbying
problem. (We will assume that the number of vertices n is odd, and that the minimum degree of G is at
least k, since k-Dominating Set remains W [2]-complete under these restrictions.)
• The 0/1 matrix E consists of two sets of rows, the top set, indexed by V = {1, ..., n}, and the bottom
set, consisting of n−2k+1 additional rows. The matrix E has n+1 columns, with the ﬁrst column
being the template column, and the remaining n columns indexed by V .
• The template column has 0’s in all of the top set row entries, and 1’s in all of the bottom set row
entries.
• A column indexed by a vertex v, in the top row positions, has 0’s in those rows that are indexed
by vertices u ∈ N [v]. In the bottom row positions, the entries can be computed by ﬁrst setting all
of these entries to 1, and then changing (arbitrarily) n− k − |N [v]|+ 1 of these entries to 0. (This
insures that in every column indexed by a vertex the total number of 0’s is one more than the total
number of 1’s.)
• The vector x = (1, 1, . . . , 1) of length n + 1 has a 1 in each position.
• The parameter k remains the same.
We claim that this is a yes-instance of OL if and only if G has a k-dominating set.
One direction is easy. If G has a k-dominating set, then The Lobby corrupts the corresponding agents,
or formally, we edit the corresponding rows. With respect to the ﬁrst (template) column, we thus have
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the opportunity to change k of the 0’s to 1’s. Since in the ﬁrst column, initially, the “1” outcome was
losing by 2k− 1 votes, and since each of these k edit operations decreases the diﬀerence by 2 (as there is
one more 1 and one less 0), the outcome in the ﬁrst (template) column is a victory for the “1” outcome,
by 1. Since the chosen rows for editing represent a dominating set in G, we are similarly able to advantage
each vertex column contest by at least 2, and since each of these was losing by one vote, we are able to
secure majorities of 1 in every column.
Conversely, suppose the described instance of OL has a solution. Necessarily, the rows chosen to be
edited must be in the top set of rows (indexed by vertices of G), since otherwise obtaining a majority
of 1’s in the ﬁrst column will not be possible. Any solution that consists of rows in the top set of rows
must therefore provide at least one opportunity, for each vertex column (indexed by v), of editing in a
row that is indexed by a vertex u ∈ N [v]. Thus, any such solution corresponds to a k-dominating set in
G.
Proposition 2. Optimal Lobbying (OL) is in W [2].
Proof. One of the standard techniques of proving that a problem is in the class W [2] is to reduce our
problem to another problem which is already known to be in W [2]. We reduce to the W [2]-complete
Independent k-Dominating Set problem [8], page 464. Given an n by m 0/1 matrix E = (eij), a
positive integer k, and a length m 0/1 vector x, proceed as follows:
1. Calculate w = n/2+ 1, which is the number of votes required to pass any particular referendum
question.
2. For 1 ≤ j ≤ m, let
δ(j) =
{
max(0, w −
∑
i eij), xj = 1,
max(0,
∑
i eij − w + 1), xj = 0.
3. Since δ(j) is the number of votes that The Lobby is away from the desired outcome in the jth
referendum, when δ(j) > k, for at least one j, we have a trivial negative instance.
4. For each J = 1, . . . ,m, let Cj = {i | eij = xj , 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Then Cj is the set of voters who are
naturally inclined to vote against the interests of The Lobby in the jth referendum.
An OL solution of size k will be any set K ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that the cardinality of K is k and
|K ∩ Cj | ≥ δ(j) for every j = 1, . . . ,m.
Let us construct the graph G as speciﬁed below. The vertex set of G consists of the following vertices:
• xab is a vertex, for 1 ≤ a ≤ k, 1 ≤ b ≤ n.
• xa∞ is a vertex, for 1 ≤ a ≤ k.
• ycd is a vertex, for 1 ≤ c ≤ m, 1 ≤ d ≤
(
k
k−δ(c)+1
)
.
The edges of G are as follows:
• For every 1 ≤ a ≤ k, the subgraph induced on {xab | 1 ≤ b ≤ n or b = ∞} is complete.
• For every 1 ≤ b ≤ n (but not b = ∞) the subgraph induced on {xab | 1 ≤ a ≤ k} is complete.
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• For every 1 ≤ c ≤ m, let fc be a bijection from {1, 2, . . . ,
(
k
k−δ(c)+1
)
to the set of all subsets of
{1, . . . , k} of cardinality k− δ(c) + 1. Then the vertex ycd is connected by an edge to each member
of {xab | a ∈ fc(d), b ∈ Cc}.
We will show now that G has a k-Independent Dominating Set S if and only if (E , k, x) is a positive instance
of OL. First, assume that G has a k-Independent Dominating Set S. Then each xa∞ is dominated, and,
since it is connected only to vertices xab, where 1 ≤ b ≤ n, at least one vertex xab must be in S for each
1 ≤ a ≤ k.As S is of size k, it includes exactly one of the xab for each a. As S is independent, it cannot
include xsb and xtb for s = t.
Now, let K = {b | xab ∈ S for some a}. The cardinality of K is k, so, if |K ∩ Cj | ≥ δ(j) for every j,
then K is an OL solution of size k.
For every j, consider the set Yj = {yjd | 1 ≤ d ≤
(
k
k−δ(j)+1
)
}. Since each of these vertices is
dominated, some member of {xab | a ∈ fj(d), b ∈ Cj} is in S for each d. Since fj(d) ranges over all
subsets of {1, . . . , k} of cardinality k, at least δ(j) members of {xab | a ∈ {1, . . . , k}, b ∈ Cj} are in S and
therefore at least δ(j) members of Cj are in K. Thus K is an OL solution.
Conversely, imagine that K is an OL solution of size k. Choose an arbitrary enumeration θ of elements
of K and denote S = {xiθ(i) | 1 ≤ i ≤ k}. S is independent, because there is no edge between xiθ(i) and
xjθ(j) unless i = j. Since i ranges over 1, . . . , k, each vertex xab is dominated. Since K is an OL solution,
for each j at least δ(j) members of Cj are in K. Thus, by the construction of S, at least δ(j) members of
{xab | a ∈ {1, . . . , k}, b ∈ Cj} are in S, so that some member of {xab | a ∈ fj(d), b ∈ Cj} is in S for each
d, and yjd is dominated for each j and each d. Thus S is an Independent Dominating Set of size k.
Together, the two propositions above give the following complete classiﬁcation of the parametrized
complexity of the problem.
Theorem 1. Optimal Lobbying is W [2]-complete.
4 Conclusion
This paper shows that parameterized complexity is a very appropriate tool for analyzing the computa-
tional diﬃculty of problems in social choice. We believe that the methods of parameterized complexity
will be especially useful when dealing with problems regarding voting. Indeed, any voting situation stip-
ulates the existence of two parameters: the number of voters n and the number of alternatives m. The
sizes of these two parameters are very diﬀerent. While the number of voters can be, and usually is, very
large, the number of alternatives is small, seldom exceeding 20. Hence, the contribution of the relatively
small number of alternatives to the complexity of the problem is limited, and this should be reﬂected
in the method of investigation. We believe the best way to do so is to use the conceptual framework of
parameterized complexity.
Some 15 years ago, Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick [1] pioneered the study of voting procedures from the
viewpoint of complexity theory. In particular, they proved that Dodgson Score and Kemeny Score
are NP-complete and Dodgson Winner and Kemeny Winner are NP-hard. The latter two problems
were proved to be complete for parallel access to NP [13, 14]. The problems Kemeny Score and
Kemeny Winner are Fixed Parameter Tractable. However, the parametrized complexity of Dodgson
Score and Dodgson Winner remains open.
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